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COMMENTS
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND TAX-EXEMPT STATUS
FOR LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
Marker v. Schultz,
485 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
Plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin Treasury officials from continuing
to grant or recognize the tax-exempt status of labor organizations inso-
far as that status applies to tax-exempt membership dues used by the
union for partisan political campaigns.' Plaintiffs alleged that the
candidates were given the equivalent of a federal financial subsidy in
violation of the constitutional limits imposed upon the taxing and
spending powers of Congress by article I, section 8. The district court
denied plaintiffs' request for a three-judge court and ordered the com-
plaint dismissed with prejudice.2 The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia affirmed and held: The tax-exempt
status granted to labor organizations does not violate the implied first
amendment ban prohibiting governmental establishment of a political
movement, and consequently does not violate the constitutional limita-
tions on congressional spending.'
The Internal Revenue Code exempts certain types of organizations
1. Plaintiffs were workers required to pay union dues under a compulsory union
shop contract. In raising the particular constitutional challenge discussed, however,
standing as taxpayers and private attorneys general was asserted. Marker v. Schultz,
485 F.2d 1003, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
2. Id.
3. Marker v. Schultz, 485 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Plaintiffs also alleged
that they were being compelled to provide financial support for parties and candidates
they did not approve or favor, in contravention of their rights under the first, fifth,
and ninth amendments of the Constitution. Id. at 1004. The court disagreed and held
that dissenting union members had the right to be free of political use of their dues,
but that their remedies would be limited to restitution to each individual employee of
that portion of his money which the union expended for political use or to an injunc-
tion prohibiting expenditures for political causes of that portion of the dissenting mem-
bers' dues. Id. at 1005. See Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113,
118-21 (1963); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 765-70, 774-
75 (1961).
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from taxation,4 and the general power of Congress to establish these
exemptions has been held constitutional.5 Some judicial limitations
have been imposed on these statutory grants of exemption, however.
The Internal Revenue Code has been construed to deny exempt status
to racially discriminatory private schools' and fraternal orders." Sim-
ilarly, tax deductions for contributions made to those organizations
have also been denied, 8 and tax benefits accorded certain racially dis-
criminatory organizations have been held unconstitutional. 9 However,
4. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 501(c). Included among the organizations granted
tax exemptions are: (1) corporations which are organized by act of Congress and are
instrumentalities of the United States; (2) charitable organizations; (3) civic leagues
not organized for profit; (4) labor, agricultural, and horticultural organizations; (5)
business leagues, chambers of commerce, real estate boards, or boards of trade not or-
ganized for profit; (6) nonprofit social clubs; (7) fraternal societies or orders; (8) vol-
untary employees' beneficiary associations; (9) benevolent life insurance associations
of purely local character; and (10) nonprofit credit unions without capital stock.
5. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 21 (1916); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 44 F. Supp. 863, 866 (D. Minn. 1942); Phipps v. Bowers, 46
F.2d 164, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1930), affd, 49 F.2d 996 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S.
641 (1931).
6. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), a!f'd sub
nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (permanent injunction granted since tax ex-
emption would frustrate public policy declared in post-Civil War amendments and Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c to 2000d-4 (1970)); Green v. Kennedy, 309
F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v.
Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970) (preliminary injunction against tax exemption granted);
cf. Crenshaw County Private School Foundation v. Connally, 343 F. Supp. 495 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), affd, 474 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2604 (1974)
(suit seeking to retain benefits for private school dismissed); Bob Jones Univ. v. Con-
nally, 472 F.2d 903 (4th Cir.), a! Id, 94 S. Ct. 2038 (1974) (injunction to prevent
Treasury Department from withdrawing tax exemption to private racially discrimina-
tory university denied).
7. McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge court).
8. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), aff'd sub
nom. Colt v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
9. McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 456-59 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge
court). The court held INT. Rnv. CODE of 1954, §§ 501(c)(8) (exemptions granted
fraternal organizations) and 170(c)(4) (deductibility of contributions to fraternal or-
ders) violative of the fifth amendment due process clause. Although federal action was
involved, the reasoning of the court was based on "state action" and equal protection
considerations generally applied in fourteenth amendment cases:
Plaintiff's claim thus leads us into the murky waters of the "state action" doc-
trine, for we must determine whether ...the Federal Government has sup-
ported or encouraged private discrimination so as to have itself violated plain-
tiffs right to the equal protection of the laws.
338 F. Supp. at 455 (footnote omitted). Tax exemptions established by INT. Rnv.
CODE of 1954, § 501(c) (7) for racially discriminatory nonprofit social clubs were held
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the denial of certain tax advantages to racially discriminatory organiza-
tions has not been extended to religious organizations. Thus, in Walz
v. Tax Commission"' the Supreme Court held that property tax ex-
emptions granted religious organizations did not violate the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment. The Court reasoned that the leg-
islative purpose of the exemption was not aimed at establishing, spon-
soring, or supporting religion,11 nor was there excessive governmental
entanglement with religion12  or actual sponsorship of religion.13
Since, as the Court recognized, the tax exemption for religious organi-
zations resulted in at least minimal governmental involvement, 4 the
Walz Court in effect adopted a "benevolent neutrality" standard.
constitutional, however. 338 F. Supp. at 457-59.
State statutes granting tax exemptions to racially discriminatory organizations have
also been held unconstitutional. Pitts v. Department of Rev., 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D.
Wis. 1971) (three-judge court) (Wisconsin statutes, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 70.11(4),
71.01(3)(a) (1969), which provided for tax exemptions, held to violate fourteenth
amendment equal protection clause when applied to racially discriminatory private or-
ganizations); Falkenstein v. Department of Rev., 350 F. Supp. 887 (D. Ore. 1972)
(three-judge court), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1099 (1973) (Oregon tax exemptions,
ORr. REV. STAT. §§ 307.134(1)(c), (2), 307.136, 317.080(2) (1971), held unconstitu-
tional when applied to racially discriminatory fraternal orders).
10. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). While this is the only Supreme Court opinion on this
issue, earlier lower court opinions also sustained the constitutionality of property tax
exemptions to religious organizations. Swallow v. United States, 325 F.2d 97, 98 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 951 (1964); Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d
644, 298 P.2d 1, appeal dismissed sub nom. Heisey v. County of Alameda, 352 U.S.
921 (1956); Murray v. Comptroller of Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 397-404, 216 A.2d
897, 905-09, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966); General Fin. Corp. v. Archetto, 93
R I. 392. 399-402, 176 A.2d 73, 77-79 (1961), appeal dismissed, 369 U.S. 423 (1962).
II. 397 U.S. at 672-73:
[The tax exemption] has not singled out one particular church or religious
group . . . rather, it has granted exemption to all houses of religious worship
within a broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations
[considered to be] beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life
12. id. at 674: "Elimination of exemption would tend to expand the involvement
of government by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclo-
sures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal
processes."
13. Id. at 675: "The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the govern-
ment does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from de-
manding that the church support the state."
14. Id. at 674.
For an analysis of the difference between a tax exemption as a tax subsidy and as
a recognition of the inapplicability of taxing the exempted organization, see Bittker,
Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285 (1969).
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Labor organizations have enjoyed tax-exempt status since 19 0 9 ,1"
with only limited qualifications. 16 Although charitable organizations
are expressly prohibited from engaging in political activity,17 Congress
has repeatedly rejected proposals to enact such a prohibition for labor
organizations.'
The court in Marker accepted without discussion the existence of
an implied first amendment ban which prohibits the Government from
establishing a political movement,' 9 but held that the tax exemption
challenged did not violate that implied ban. Relying on Walz, the
court found that the -tax exemptions challenged constituted only "min-
imal and remote" governmental involvement having a neutral stance
15. Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 113. This tax ex-
emption was carried over into the first income tax act, Income Tax Act of 1913, ch.
16, § ilg(a), 38 Stat. 172. Today the tax-exempt status of unions is based on INT.
RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(5).
16. Labor organizations, and agricultural and horticultural organizations which are
entitled to exemption from taxation, must "(1) Have no net earnings inuring to the
benefit of any members, and (2) Have as their objects the betterment of the condi-
tions of those engaged in such pursuits ... " Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(5)-1(a)
(1958)
17. INT. RaV. Cona of 1954, § 501(c)(3).
18. Amendments denying tax exemptions for unions if dues are used in political
campaigns have been defeated by the Senate. 115 CONG. REc. 37,624 (1969); 115
CONG. Rac. 38,318 (1969); 117 CONG. Rc. 42,371 (1971).
Federal criminal sanctions have been established to restrict union contributions to
federal election campaigns. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Supp. II, 1972) prohibits union contri-
butions to candidates for federal office but permits the union to establish a separate
fund financed by members' voluntary contributions to be used for political contribu-
tions. See Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972) (voluntary fund
for conduct occurring before enactment of Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,
Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 10 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Supp. II, 1972)), held
permissible).
This statute has been held not to apply to statements supporting candidates made in
union newspapers published regularly for union members. United States v. CIO, 335
U.S. 106 (1948). Expenditures for television programs supporting candidates would,
however, be illegal. United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
19. No authority for this proposition was cited in the court's opinion or in plain-
tiffs' brief, nor has any supporting authority been found. This implied first amendment
ban raises the question whether the provisions for federal support for political cam-
paigns established in the 1971 modifications of the Internal Revenue Code are constitu-
tional. Relevant sections of the Code include: INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 41 (allowing
tax credit equal to one-half of all political contributions with maximum credit of
$12.50); id. § 218 (allowing as alternative to § 41 a tax deduction for political contri-
butions up to $50); and id. H8 6096, 9001-13 (establishing "Presidential Election
Campaign Fund," which allows $1 of individual's income taxes to be provided to presi-
dential candidates).
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toward unions' political activities. 20  Since similarly neutral tax exemp-
tions for religious organizations do not violate the first amendment es-
tablishment clause,2' the court concluded that tax exemptions to
unions do not violate the ban on governmental establishment of politi-
cal movements.22 The Marker court also distinguished on two
grounds the major cases dealing with racially discriminatory organiza-
20. 485 F.2d at 1006.
21. See text accompanying notes 10-14 supra.
22. An alternative basis for sustaining the court's holding was also presented: the
tax exemption granted labor organizations does not result in federal expenditures, and
thus no federal contributions to political candidates has occurred. See note 28 infra.
However, the entire opinion suggests that this reason is only a secondary basis for the
court's holding. The racial discrimination cases were distinguished from the Marker
situation only in terms of governmental involvement, see text accompanying notes 25-
27 infra, not in terms of whether the particular exemption resulted in federal expendi-
tures. Moreover, the court apparently concluded that any federal expenditures resulting
from a tax exemption would not justify a taxpayer's suit challenging the constitutional-
ity of those expenditures:
[A] tax exemption . . . does not constitute such state support for or partici-
pation in the various activities undertaken by the organizations as to be equiv-
alent, in constitutional terms, to a tax and appropriation for those purposes.
485 F.2d at 1006.
In Walz, the "benevolent neutrality" standard applied was in part predicated on a
balancing of two potentially conflicting constitutional doctrines, the establishment
clause and the free exercise clause. Thus, the possible violation of the establishment
clause had to be weighed against a possible violation of the free exercise clause by tax-
ing religious organizations. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (mu-
nicipal ordinance taxing religious organization for distributing literature violates first
amendment). A somewhat similar situation may exist with respect to the question of
union political contributions presented in Marker. The implied prohibition of Govern-
ment establishment of a political movement may conflict with possible first amendment
rights of expression and political support. In United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106
(1948), the Court construed the federal statute prohibiting contributions or expendi-
tures by labor organizations in connection with federal elections not to apply to publi-
cations made by the union in the regular course of business. The Court stated that
with an opposite construction, "the gravest doubt would arise in our minds as to its
constitutionality." Id. at 121. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) ("To
deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of free speech is in effect
to penalize them for such speech"). See also Ferman, Congressional Controls on Cam-
paign Financing: An Expansion or Contraction of the First Amendment, 22 AM. U.L.
REv. I, 22-23 (1972):
Alternative remedies which do not restrict expression but rather promote the
governmental interest by expanding expression have constitutional preference
in first amendment adjudication. Such alternatives as free broadcast time or
mailing privilege, public subsidization of a campaign, or tax incentives for
contributions avoid invading the first amendment protected areas and are com-
patible with the basic assumptions of democratic self-government that the first
amendment emphasizes.
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tions. 13  The court noted first that the laws challenged in those cases
provided for positive Government support, including tax deductibility
to donors making supporting contributions,2 4 and secondly, that the
constitutional rights protected by the post-Civil War amendments pre-
vent even "minimal and remote involvement" that may foster racial
discrimination.25
Plaintiffs' contention in Marker that the federal government is in
effect giving federal funds to political candidates was dependent upon
a determination that the tax exemption granted to labor organizations
is equivalent to a tax subsidy. Two methods of analysis are possible
to verify whether a particular tax exemption is a subsidy: (1) the
legislative history may be examined to determine if the exemption was
intended to provide economic support;26 or (2) the exemption may
be examined to determine if it functions as a subsidy.2r In the latter,
23. McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge court);
Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), af'd sub nom.
Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). See notes 7-9 supra and accompanying text.
24. Tax deductions for donations to charitable organizations, permitted by INT.
REv. CODE of 1954, § 170, have been viewed as a mark of governmental approval of
the recipient organizations. McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 462 (D.D.C.
1972). While union dues are tax deductible as business expenses of the dues-paying
member, Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15 (1958), if a substantial part of a labor union's activi-
ties consists of political activity, a deduction is not allowed for the portion used for
political contributions. Id. § 1.162-20(c)(3). Thus the provision for tax deductions
for union dues need not be viewed as evidence of governmental approval of union po-
litical contributions.
25. Pitts v. Department of Rev., 333 F. Supp. 662, 668 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (three-
judge court); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1167 (D.D.C.) (three-judge
court), ajf'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
Even under the special standard for racial discrimination cases, state support by fur.
nishing necessary services, such as police and fire protection, is not constitutionally ob-
jectionable. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972).
26. Under this analysis, a finding that the exemption was established for a purpose
other than to provide economic benefits to the exempted organization would permit a
conclusion that a tax subsidy did not exist, but rather that the legislative intent in cre-
ating the exemption was to define taxable income.
The court in Marker seemed to employ this approach. The court stated that the
tax exemption to labor organizations was based on the concept that a pooling of indi-
vidual resources was involved, as contrasted with entrepreneurial profit of corporations,
and that plaintiffs are not protected by the Constitution from a governmental decision
that union dues are not proper objects of taxation. Thus the court seemed to conclude
that the legislative intent was not to provide for federal expenditures to labor organiza-
tions, but rather was to determine that union funds are not proper objects of taxation.
27. This analysis was used in McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C.
1972) (three-judge court), in holding that the tax exemptions granted fraternal
orders were tax subsidies, but the exemptions to nonprofit social clubs were only
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss1/10
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functional analysis two steps are required. First, the overall tax policy
must be evaluated to establish what types of funds are to be taxed."8
Then the exemption in question must be scrutinized to determine if
the funds exempted are of the type that would be taxed, absent the
exemption.29  While the Marker court apparently adopted the legis-
lative intent approach, the functional analysis can also lead to a con-
clusion that a tax subsidy does not result from tax exemptions granted
to unions. The union's funds may be considered a collection of in-
dividual members' business expenses and as such may not be the type
of funds that are taxed generally.5 0
A conclusion that a subsidy does not exist would permit only a con-
stitutional challenge based on a governmental involvement theory,
analogous to a "state action" argument, that the Government was so
involved with the activities of the private organization that the conduct
of the private organization may be imputed to the Government. It
income-defining provisions. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 511, 512(a) provide that
the income of nonprofit social clubs, including passive investment income, is taxed
at the regular corporate rates with a deduction for "exempt function income,"
defined essentially as income derived from members. The passive investment income
of fraternal orders is not taxed. Id. The court reasoned that "exempt function in-
come" is not the sort of income usually taxed and that the provision for tax exemption
was only income-defining. Since the passive investment income of fraternal orders is
not taxed, the court concluded that federal economic benefit is being provided, and
thus. a tax subsidy exists. A critical commentary on this technique is given in Bittker
& Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the Internal Revenue Code,
82 YALE LJ. 51 (1972).
28. Bittker & Kaufman, supra note 27, state that to distinguish subsidies from
income-defining provisions requires the acceptance of an "ideal" income tax base that
defines all the taxable income. This "ideal" income tax can then serve as a standard
to determine when various tax provisions result in deviation from the "ideal" tax. Id.
at 63. This article, however, went on to note that no income tax law in this country
even closely approached the "ideal" income tax base. Id. at 64.
29. Labor organizations are similar to fraternal orders in that the passive invest-
ment income of neither type of organization is taxed. However, the court in
McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge court), may
have used the "subsidy" finding more to demonstrate improper Government ap-
proval than to prove impermissible federal financing. Logically, if the passive invest-
ment income represents the only funds for which the tax exemption operates as a sub-
sidy, then only the exemption for the passive investment income should be disallowed.
In addition, the McGlotten court coupled the "subsidy" finding with a finding that the
tax exemption to fraternal orders was provided only to particular organizations with
particular purposes, rather than across the board, thus indicating Government approval.
Thus the McGlotten court may have relied more on governmental involvement consid-
erations than on federal expenditure considerations.
30. See notes 26 & 28 supra.
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has been held, however, that a tax exemption alone is insufficient gov-
ernmental involvement in the activities of the private organization to
constitute governmental participation in those activities8 1
Even assuming a tax subsidy exists, Walz indicates that limited
governmental economic benefits are not constitutionally barred when
provided to private organizations that engage in conduct in which the
Government could not participate because of constitutional prohibi-
tions. The only cases prohibiting even "minimal and remote" govern-
mental involvement are those cases in which the constitutionally pro-
hibited conduct was racially discriminatory.8 2 Thus the standard ap-
pears to be that, except for cases involving racial discrimination, "mini-
mal and remote' governmental involvement resulting from the grant of
a -tax exemption does not violate constitutional prohibitions on Govern-
ment conduct.
31. Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co.,
435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 906 (1971); Browns v. Mitchell,
409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969); Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710, 713 (4th Cir. 1964);
Family Forum v. Archdiocese of Detroit, 347 F. Supp. 1167 (E.D. Mich. 1972);
Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aftd, 445 F.2d 412 (7th
Cir. 1971).
32. For supporting cases, see notes 6 & 9 supra.
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